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Jennifer Curtis, author of Human Rights as War by Other Means, 
traces the use of rights discourse in Northern Ireland's politics from the local 
civil rights campaigns of the 1960s to present-day activism for truth recovery 
and LGBT equality (p. 33). While reading this remarkable study, I asked 
myself to what extent her criticism of human “rights discourse has functioned 
as a war by other means” (p. 4) in Northern Ireland. The end to the IRA’s 
military campaign eventually led to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA), 
signed between the British and Irish governments, that brought a fragile but 
enduring peace to Northern Ireland. Dr. Curtis maintains that the Northern 
Ireland conflict remains “unique” in different angles, most notably the 
circumstance that “non-state actors” were responsible for “many casualties” 
(pp. 25-33). Though, certain topics are not “unique” to Ulster. Her political 
question is whether and how people use the language of human rights to 
legitimate violence which is challenged throughout the globe, at any time, 
particularly considering “humanitarian interventions”. She rejects that “human 
rights” are exclusively debated as “the only kind of politics”, but she brings 
forward that its “discourse” has overshadowed “other global issues”. She also 
believes that “historical analysis” of this peace settlement in Northern Ireland 
enables us to think in more concrete terms on the consequences of “legal or 
abstract principles” (p. 34).  
To categorize the conflicting communities in Northern Ireland, she 
prefers the terms “political,” “ethno-political,” or “national.” As an 
anthropologist, she recognizes that interviewees formed her “understanding of 
the conflict”. Most of them were secular working-class, which are religious in 
name. As a consequence, she rejects the categorization as “sectarian” in her 
analysis. For her it may serve to “describing specific phenomena, like 
religious discrimination”. Nonetheless, she underlines that religion 
characterizes “political identity” (p. 43). In her view, she would have seen “the 
conflict differently if she had worked with the Orange Order or a Catholic 
organization” as “religious institutions have had contested degrees of 
importance and influence within political groupings over time”. 
Civil rights discourse in Northern Ireland serves as a reminder “against 
uncritically accepting discursive claims”. Even though it simultaneously warns 
of  “purism about human rights politics”. The Civil rights movement in Ulster 
is integrated in the “global expansion of human rights advocacy and law since 
the end of the twentieth century”. Like other critics, she tries to get to the 
bottom of “the proliferation or politicization of human rights.” While she 
remains “suspicious of rights talk”, she rejects warnings about “third 
generation” or “invented” rights which according to her miss the political 
foundations and the achievements of “the human rights project”. Thus, the 
allegation of “politicization” often incriminates the rights of minorities who 
attempt to obtain legitimate “access to both rhetorical power and legal 
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authority”. These entitlements shall provide political, economic, and legal 
equality. By rejection, instead of “critically assessing”, opponents limit human 
right demands, Curtis claims (pp. 103-8). 
For adherents of “armed struggle, the Irish nation’s right to sovereignty 
and self-determination has ideological precedence over other rights”. The 
anthropologist stresses that “the primacy of national rights means that 
jurisdictional differences in legal rights are less important than sovereignty” 
(p. 112). Until the GFA, the Irish constitution claimed sovereignty over the 
whole island, this constitutional requirement rests “symbolic” for Jennifer 
Curtis. After the referendum in 1998, those articles granted citizenship to 
northern Irish, giving up on reunification. She upholds “that communal rights 
have succeeded at the expense of economic rights” (p. 94). With regard to 
history, she assumes that “anti-Catholic discrimination created inequalities 
between nationalists and unionists, making class-based alliances difficult” (p. 
100). Even though  “class structures are converging” due to anti-
discrimination legislation and enforcement since the 1970s. Nevertheless, 
Northern Ireland stays one of the least developed regions in the UK, while the 
Republic of Ireland has not recovered economically since the 2008 financial 
crisis. 
On the preferability of war by rhetorical means over war by physical 
violence, she writes that nonetheless a war by rhetoric “creates vulnerabilities 
for the future”. To the question if renewed inter-communal violence in 
Northern Ireland is likely, she responds that “some new and former 
combatants continue to pursue armed struggle, and inter-communal clashes 
continue”. For example, Loyalists took to the streets because of the flag issue; 
republican opponents to the Good Friday Agreements planned bomb attacks in 
Belfast. For her, the great danger consists of a return to violence and she puts 
the questions, “how intense it will be, and how much it will cost: in lives, and 
in people’s diminished political capacity, quality of life, and economic 
opportunity” (pp. 128-9). 
Whether the Good Friday Agreements (GFA) is doomed to fail, she 
asks if the GFA has been “the best agreement” that the signatories could reach. 
But unless there is public honesty about what the GFA does not achieve, and 
political will to address its gaps, she assumes it is “a fragile peace” (p. 201). 
The short detention of Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams - on his alleged role in 
terrorist acts in 1972 - may prove the agreement flawed (pp. 153-8). Adams 
denies ever being in the IRA but was the crucial interlocutor in enabling Sinn 
Féin to secure a ceasefire from paramilitaries in the mid-1990s. Curtis blames 
all sides to have failed “to develop an approach to truth recovery” which 
shows “that the GFA has not transformed the conflict”. She claims the GFA 
may be “a station on the way to a more permanent settlement”. For a 
successful peace accord, the parties to the treaty should first analyze and 
resolve “the GFA’s flaws and oversights”. In general, the main concern rests 
in “maintaining the GFA”, disregarding “other political goals”. As the result 
of a long negotiation process, the GFA came about that is why she understands 
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its value and defense. But she draws attention to the fact “that beneficiaries of 
this particular settlement are unwilling to entertain alternatives because change 
could threaten their positions”. Their ignorance oppresses constructive 
criticism, and eliminates the evaluation “of alterations or alternatives” (pp. 
207-11). 
She describes the GFA as having produced a “minimal” peace (p. 25). 
In her view, the basic characteristics of a “maximal” peace would be “robust 
peace that politics and society enable, or at least allow, citizens to engage in 
disagreements and pursue political goals”. Vital and essential are “institutions 
and practices that enable political agency, rather than structural or direct 
violence”.  Eventually, this is theory – “in practice, building institutions and 
practices takes time, effort, and continuing renewal”. To the contrary, failure 
would result in “collective rights … [to] authorize and reproduce compulsion 
within groups”. So when daily life rests on “survival” and membership in the 
nationalist or unionist camps, “publicly challenging the failures of established 
politics is dangerous”, Curtis points out. Last but not least, she summarizes 
that “[w]hen the institutions of peace reproduce these categories as the basis 
for legitimate political expression, other experiences and politics are further 
marginalized—and ‘choice’ becomes even closer to meaningless” (p.21). 
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